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Embedded Intelligence 
for Electrical Network 
Operation and Control
Victoria M. Catterson, Euan M. Davidson, and Stephen D.J. McArthur, 
University of Strathclyde
Integrating multiple 
types of intelligent, 
mulitagent data 
analysis within 
a smart grid can 
pave the way for 
lexible, extensible, 
and robust solutions 
to power network 
management.
method is to focus on changing consumer 
behavior using metering and smart appli-
ances,1 another considers the network itself 
and favors a new approach to controlling 
and operating the existing grid infrastruc-
ture (see http://www.smartgrids.eu).
Smarter operation of the existing network 
naturally suggests the use of intelligent sys-
tems techniques to perform or enhance 
many of the activities currently performed 
by engineers. Traditionally, engineers view 
electrical networks as either transmission 
or distribution networks. Although both 
types are managed from a centralized con-
trol room with the aim of balancing supply 
and demand, certain features differentiate 
the two. Namely, transmission networks are 
characterized by
• high-voltage, meshed networks used for 
bulk transfer of power;
• large-scale generators (such as coal-ired, 
gas, and nuclear stations), where the net-
work control engineers are responsible for 
the dispatch of generation;
• supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA) systems that give engineers 
visibility of voltages and currents around 
the network and provide remote control 
of devices such as circuit breakers and 
telecontrolled switches; and
• engineers reconiguring the network as 
needed to handle various contingencies.
In contrast, distribution networks tradi-
tionally are characterized by
• lower-voltage, radial networks designed 
to deliver energy from the transmission 
network to customers (in homes, busi-
nesses, and industry);
• little or no generation connected, making 
dispatch of generation impossible;
• SCADA systems that offer only visibility 
of the network, as many devices are 
manually operated; and
• engineers rarely reconiguring the net-
work to handle emergency situations.
Various smart-grid visions presuppose a fu-
ture in which these passive, radial distribution 
networks with unidirectional power lows 
evolve into networks with increasing levels 
of embedded generation, demand response, 
W
ithin North America, Europe, and other territories, there is politi-
cal will to adapt and augment existing electrical networks to meet 
our future energy needs. Such smart grids involve changes broadly aimed to 
increase eficiencies while lowering costs and energy usage. Although one 
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monitoring, automation, and control. 
This radically alters the network’s op-
erational requirements, challenging en-
gineers to design active control for re-
sponse to system events while offering 
more data for automated analysis of 
network and asset health.
In this article, we present indus-
trial examples of intelligent systems 
providing the smart functionality for 
these tasks. Speciically, we discuss 
autonomous control at the distri-
bution level, automated analysis of 
data from highly observable power 
systems, and the use of multiagent sys-
tems technology for distributing and 
integrating smart functionality. We 
show how using intelligent systems is 
key to addressing these problems in 
ways that are lexible, robust, and un-
derstandable to engineers, supporting 
the delivery of a more eficient grid.
Autonomous Control of a 
Distribution Network
Connecting small-scale generation 
to distribution networks leads to a 
raft of problems collectively termed 
congestion. This includes rises in 
voltage (caused by the reverse power 
low back to transmission), current 
overloads at network bottlenecks (due 
to the generators producing currents 
the network is not rated to handle), 
or increased load associated with new 
customers or electric vehicles.
Traditionally, engineers designed or 
adapted networks to avoid congestion 
by building extra lines or replacing 
transformers. However, such network 
reinforcements can be expensive. An 
alternative is using an active net-
work management (ANM) strategy 
to provide automated control to deal 
with overload conditions. An ANM 
scheme can include the following con-
trol tasks: automatic network recon-
iguration to keep as many customers 
as possible on supply, control of gen-
erators to keep power lows within 
limits and avoid overloading of lines, 
coordinated control of voltage regula-
tion measures, and control of the net-
work to minimize losses. 
For all these functions, network 
operators require solutions with the 
following properties:
• Flexibility. Engineers desire solu-
tions that can be deployed in vari-
ous situations—that is, in different 
network topologies with different 
control measures.
• Extensibility. Networks change; 
new generators can be added and 
old ones removed. Regulations 
also change, opening up new ser-
vices and possibilities for network 
control. ANM systems can be ex-
tended without replacing the entire 
control system.
• Graceful degradation. Measurement 
error and failure of the communi-
cation systems underpinning ANM 
schemes are inevitable. Thus, per-
formance must degrade gracefully 
when a scheme is presented with 
bad data or communications fail-
ures occur. 
Figure 1 illustrates an example util-
ity that desired an ANM solution to 
manage power lows in the electri-
cal network. The igure shows two 
132-kV lines feeding a distribution 
network through two transformers, 
rated at 45 megavolt ampere (MVA). 
The distribution network is at 33 kV, 
with almost 85 MW of installed gen-
eration (generators 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8). 
The minimum local load in this net-
work is 10 MW, meaning that certain 
conditions see an export of 75 MW 
from the 33-kV network through the 
transformers (85 MW of generation, 
10-MW load).
In this scenario, if one of the two 
45-MVA transformers is removed 
from service, the remaining trans-
former will be overloaded. To handle 
such eventualities, bespoke systems 
for detecting overloads were previ-
ously installed on the network. One 
system monitors for the loss of one 
transformer to mitigate such a sce-
nario. If a transformer is lost, the 
current on lines 1 and 3 is moni-
tored, and too high a current results 
in a trip signal being sent to the hydro 
generator. Removing the hydro plant 
from the network reduces the power 
being exported through the remaining 
transformer, and thus power low is 
kept within limits. 
Due to the incremental building of 
wind farms in this area, the number 
of bespoke systems in place has in-
creased over time. There are now nine 
special control schemes in place, each 
monitoring for a different scenario 
requiring different control. It is hard 
for engineers to manage this area of 
network because the complexity of 
the automated systems leads to con-
trol actions being taken that are not 
straightforward and understandable. 
Engineers wanted a solution that 
could automatically handle power-
low management in an explainable 
way and offer the option of manual 
power-low management, when de-
sired.2 It should be possible to apply 
this technique to multiple distribu-
tion networks—reasoning generically 
on a model of the network, rather 
than being tuned to suit only the par-
ticular installation topology.
Constraint programming tech-
nology can help meet these needs.3 
Power-low management was formu-
lated as a inite discrete domain con-
straint satisfaction problem (CSP),2 
where controllable generators consti-
tute the problem variables, with dis-
crete domains for the control signals 
that limit their output. For our ex-
ample network, we chose the domain 
of all wind farms, D " {1, 0.75, 0.5, 
0.25, 0}, and the hydrogenerator is 
D " {1, 0}.
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Three distinct types of constraints 
apply to power-low management. 
First, the low of power around the 
network must not exceed the thermal 
limits of any equipment. This tech-
nical constraint can be checked using 
a network model and a load-low en-
gine, which engineers use to manu-
ally check thermal constraints. 
Second, contractual constraints de-
termine which generators have prior-
ity access to connect. Under current 
contracts, generators either have a 
irm connection agreement, which lets 
them generate whenever and however 
much they like, or they have a nonirm 
agreement, in which they are removed 
from the network in a last-in-irst-off 
(LIFO) order. To connect more wind 
farms to the network while avoiding 
the cost of network reinforcement, 
many of the generators were offered 
nonirm connections. For the network 
in Figure 1, if an overload occurs, the 
most recently-built wind farm 5 is al-
ways irst to be removed.
The LIFO regime was introduced 
in the interest of fairness, so the gen-
erators connecting earlier would not 
see their access rights reduced if ad-
ditional generators were to connect 
in the future. However, because of 
different limits on items of equip-
ment, in some situations generator 6 
could reduce its output by 5 MW to 
alleviate the congestion, whereas the 
contractually obligated reduction of 
generator 5 must be 10 MW. In this 
situation, it would be in generator 5’s 
best interest to negotiate a bilateral 
contract with generator 6, paying it 
to reduce by 5 MW in order to con-
tinue outputting (and selling) an extra 
10 MW. Such bilateral contracts are 
not yet allowed, but the increase in 
wind penetration and subsequent net-
work congestion issues mean regu-
lation is under scrutiny and might 
change in the coming years. With the 
constraint programming approach to 
power-low management, the con-
tractual constraints can be updated 
easily with changes in regulation.
The inal type of constraint is the 
preference for maximizing access to 
the network for distributed generators. 
Thermal overloads can be removed 
Figure 1. Example distribution network. This network automatically handles power-low management in an explainable way 
and offers the option of manual power-low management. In this case, the off-the-shelf constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) 









































Electrical connection (overhead line or underground cables)
Substation
Generator (wind farm or hydro)
Bulk supply point
Communication links conveying load measurements from substation
to controller, or control signals from controller to generator
Transformer, converting 132 kV to 33 kV
Normally open point ( a connection to a neighboring network
that is normally open, not connected)
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by tripping off all generation, but it is 
preferable to maintain wind genera-
tion whenever possible. 
With this formulation of the prob-
lem, an off-the-shelf CSP solver 
running on a substation computer (see 
Figure 1) could generate solutions in 
a worst-case time of 9.7 seconds and 
under 2 seconds for most normal net-
work conditions. This is well within 
the timescales required for a control 
system to remove a thermal overload 
and is therefore a suitable approach 
to power-low management. It is also 
extensible, by updating constraints 
if there is a change in regime, and 
generic to all networks, by chang-
ing the network model for the load 
low. Crucially, engineers can under-
stand the control actions this system 
proposes because the load lows be-
fore and after action is taken show 
the thermal overload being removed. 
Graceful degradation comes from the 
CSP solver offering a ranked set of so-
lutions. Should the preferred solution 
fail due to model error, measurement 
error, or failure of communications, 
the controller can try implementing 
the next solution. 
This system is currently in the pre-
liminary stages of ield trials with 
a UK utility. Software is being de-
ployed on a substation computer in 
a 33-kV/11-kV primary substation 
for power-low management of an 
11-kV feeder with 2 MW of embed-
ded generation. Initially, an open-
loop system will generate and record 
control actions for removing thermal 
overloads. After successful trials, 
closed-loop operation should follow, 
in which control actions are au-
tomatically taken when an overload 
is detected.
Another facet of ANM is automat-
ically restoring supply after a fault. 
In contrast to power-low manage-
ment, this has been the subject of 
much research4 and has become a 
benchmark problem within AI plan-
ning.5 Although engineers are involved 
in network control, the protection sys-
tem is fully automated.
Post-Fault Analysis
The protection system is responsible 
for detecting faults (such as short cir-
cuits) and disconnecting faulty or 
faulted equipment from the network 
by opening the appropriate circuit 
breakers. This must happen within 
milliseconds up to tens of seconds to 
limit equipment damage and ensure 
that the power system remains stable. 
After a fault has occurred on the 
network, engineers are interested in 
its type and location, how much of 
the network was affected, whether 
any areas are still without supply, and 
whether the protection system oper-
ated correctly to clear the fault. These 
questions must be answered by ana-
lyzing the data generated by the fault, 
but there are different sets of data 
available. One utility, which argu-
ably operates one of the most heavily 
monitored networks in Europe, per-
forms post-fault analysis on four data 
sets:6
• SCADA alarms that record auto-
matic actions (such as high cur-
rents detected, main protection 
operating, and circuit-breakers 
triggering);
• digital fault recorder (DFR) data, 
which records high-resolution cur-
rent and voltage traces from a cir-
cuit when triggered by an incident;
• traveling-wave fault locator data, 
which indicates how far along a 
line the fault is; and
• circuit-breaker trip-coil current 
traces, indicating when the breaker 
was triggered and how long it took 
to operate.
Frequently, engineers manually 
analyze these data sets. In a typical 
year, a utility will see 3 to 6 million 
SCADA alarms and 20,000 fault 
records, but during storm condi-
tions, when many network incidents 
occur simultaneously, these igures 
can reach 20,000 SCADA alarms and 
2,000 fault records in a 24-hour pe-
riod. This rate is overwhelming for 
timely analysis.
Engineers take a holistic ap-
proach, using analysis of one data 
set to inform the analysis of another. 
In particular, a irst-pass analysis of 
SCADA alarms can prioritize DFR 
data for inspection by highlighting 
the likely faulted line. This approach 
was the basis for protection engineer-
ing diagnostic agents (PEDA), which 
integrated multiple intelligent systems 
for different aspects of data analysis.
First, a rule-based expert system 
groups SCADA alarms into events 
and then groups events into incidents. 
Assessment of the protection events 
within an incident indicates whether 
it needs further investigation. If so, 
the fault’s location and timing is com-
pared against the capture times of 
fault records to partition them into 
those directly related to an incident, 
those related to the incident, those 
indirectly related, and miscellaneous 
records with no associated incident. 
The directly related records are prior-
itized for further processing.
The type of fault and fault clear-
ance time are extracted from the 
prioritized records using a second 
rule-based expert system. At the 
same time, fault records are passed 
through a model-based reasoning en-
gine to identify incorrect operation of 
components, such as a missing inter-
trip signal or failure of a trip relay. 
These four system components are 
integrated using multiagent systems 
technology (see Figure 2). An inci-
dent and event identiication agent 
wraps the SCADA analysis function-
ality and informs subscribed agents 
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of new incidents when they occur. 
Fault-record-retrieval agents use in-
cident information to prioritize the 
collection of DFR data, which is for-
warded to a fault-record-interpretation 
agent for classiication and the protec-
tion validation and diagnosis agent 
for model-based analysis. In addition, 
agents for long-term information stor-
age and an engineer’s interface give a 
complete system for automated post-
fault analysis.
From November 2004, many of 
the PEDA agents were deployed at 
SP Energy Networks, running online 
to interpret SCADA and DFR data. 
After nearly two years of operation, 
a new SCADA system altered the for-
mat and reliability of SCADA data 
received, requiring nontrivial work 
to bring it back online. During a 
six-month snapshot of its time online, 
PEDA processed more than 2 million 
SCADA alarms and 583 fault re-
cords, which were correctly reduced 
to 402 incidents.
Condition Monitoring
Protection systems act to remove im-
mediate threats to equipment integ-
rity, but even when operated within 
limits, assets experience aging and 
shocks that degrade their health. 
Online monitoring can highlight the 
current condition and aging trend of 
important assets, letting network op-
erators target maintenance where it 
will be most beneicial.
Transformers are the most expen-
sive single asset in a transmission net-
work, and within the UK and US, 
many are coming to the end of their 
design life. To prolong their opera-
tional lives while minimizing risk of 
failure in service, online monitoring 
helps detect behavior changes and 
diagnose faults.
To this end, we created a condition-
monitoring multiagent system 
(COMMAS) that integrates three 
types of transformer health monitor-
ing.2 The irst is conventional trans-
former fault diagnosis, which in-
volves three techniques for dissolved 
gas analysis (DGA) that use ratios 
of gases in transformer oil to iden-
tify problems. Second, COMMAS 
includes a suite of agents for assess-
ing the severity of an insulation dete-
rioration phenomenon called partial 
discharge (PD), where charge travels 
but only partially bridges the insula-
tion. Earlier work trained three clas-
siiers to diagnose the defect causing 
PD and used hidden Markov models 
to detect changes in PD behavior. The 
third approach is conditional anom-
aly detection (CAD), a technique that 
meets speciic requirements of end- 
of-life transformer monitoring.
Over a transformer’s 40-year life, 
it develops a particular signature of 
normal behavior due to low-level de-
fects and shocks that degrade per-
formance while not posing risk of 
immediate failure or accelerated de-
terioration. This can be problem-
atic when monitoring health at the 
end of a transformer’s life because 
automated fault-detection and clas-
sification techniques will label its 
degraded behavior as faulty and 
needing attention.
Instead of fault diagnosis, engi-
neers are more interested in changes 
to transformer behavior, either due 
to fault progression or the develop-
ment of new problems. At the same 
time, engineers are sensitive to false 
positives. The erroneous detection 
of anomalous behavior on even a 
few occasions is likely to prejudice 
Figure 2. Integrated multiagent systems technology. Protection engineering 
diagnostic agents (PEDA) incorporate SCADA and DFR data analysis to identify fault 
type, location, and affected areas of the network and to determine whether the 
protection system operated correctly.
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engineers against anomaly detection 
techniques as a whole.
To address these challenges, CAD 
limits false positives by modeling op-
erating conditions and transformer 
condition.7 A training set of data is 
split into environmental and indica-
tor parameters, based on whether 
they affect the transformer (such as 
ambient temperature and load cur-
rent) or indicate its condition (such 
as oil temperature and oil moisture). 
Each parameter set is modeled as a 
mixture of Gaussian distributions, 
which capture the probability of pa-
rameters taking certain values. A 
third probabilistic model correlates 
the environment and indicators, map-
ping Gaussian components of one 
model to components of the other 
(see Figure 3).
Anomaly detection consists of in-
terrogating this model with new data 
and calculating the probability of 
the transformer condition given the 
environmental condition. If it ex-
ceeds a threshold of unlikeliness, it is 
deemed a true anomaly and reported 
to engineers.
The real beneit of this approach is 
that it will not raise anomalies when 
the environmental conditions are sig-
niicantly different from the training 
examples. If the transformer is oper-
ating in a heat wave, its oil tempera-
ture could be expected to be anoma-
lously high, but engineering judgment 
would ascribe the temperature rise to 
the environmental conditions rather 
than a transformer problem. Assum-
ing the environmental model does 
not capture heat-wave conditions, 
the correlated CAD model relects its 
lack of knowledge of how the trans-
former is expected to behave by re-
turning a higher probability than 
that of the transformer model alone 
(p(ind) in Figure 3). 
CAD was applied to an in-service 
275-kV/132-kV, 180-MVA transmission 
transformer in the UK.7 This trans-
former had low levels of fault indica-
tor gasses from historical problems, 
which made standard diagnostic tech-
niques inaccurate. Thus, anomaly de-
tection was required to model the 
imperfect normal transformer condi-
tions and alert engineers to any health 
changes. The CAD model was used 
to analyze 12 months of online data 
from the transformer and site, and in 
that time, it detected 21 anomalies. 
Further investigation of these anom-
alies revealed them to be temporary 
sensor or data-logging faults, where 
plausible but erroneous values were re-
corded from the transformer while en-
vironmental conditions were normal.
By including CAD within the wider 
COMMAS agent community, the ad-
vantages of anomaly detection are 
supported by fault diagnosis from 
the DGA and PD analysis agents. If 
an anomaly is detected, fault diagno-
sis can give engineers a familiar cat-
egorization of the potential problem 
to help them plan corrective main-
tenance. Equally, corroboration 
between fault diagnoses can help en-
gineers draw conclusions about the 
transformer’s health. That is, if the 
DGA and PD agents all conclude that 
PD is occurring, there is a high coni-
dence that this is indeed correct.
Furthermore, the robustness of the 
agent approach means that if one data 
source becomes inaccessible, or if an 
agent otherwise fails to perform its 
diagnosis, the others in the system 
can autonomously continue their 
tasks and present a partial view of the 
transformer’s health. In this way, the 
combination of appropriate intelli-
gent systems techniques within a mul-
tiagent system provides a condition-
monitoring approach that meets the 
requirements of lexibility, extensibil-
ity, and graceful degradation.
Agent-Based Smart-Grid 
Architecture
The potential for intelligent systems 
in many areas of network manage-
ment is clear, but these systems must 
not be left to operate in isolation. The 
interpretation of one data set can 
often beneit another, as in the case 
of post-fault analysis with SCADA 
and DFR data, but this requires com-
munication between each system. As 
more systems for data interpretation 
become capable of interoperation, the 
scope for higher levels of corrobora-
tion grows.
One example is the possibility of 
making better asset condition assess-
ments with knowledge of network 
events. Traditionally, incidents and 
events on the network are not eas-
ily available to condition-monitoring 
engineers, and they assess the health 
of assets such as transformers purely 
from condition data. However, a fault 
can draw a large current that con-
stitutes a shock to the transformer, 
temporarily increasing temperatures 
and taxing the insulation system. 
Without knowledge of network events, 
Figure 3. Conditional anomaly detection. CAD compares the probabilities of 
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condition-monitoring engineers are 
speculating about whether these wor-
rying trends are due to external forces 
or to true degradation of the trans-
former’s condition.
Information about asset health can 
also beneit control decisions. If it is 
known that a transformer is experi-
encing problems, power-low man-
agement can favor the load reduction 
on the transformer to, say, 50 per-
cent of its rating until maintenance is 
possible. If a circuit breaker’s condi-
tion suggests that it might fail, an al-
ternate network coniguration could 
help keep that connection in its cur-
rent state. This sort of planning is 
hard to achieve with the manual pro-
cedures currently in place, but the 
integration of multiple types of data 
analysis within a smart grid paves the 
way to its realization.
Such an integration of disparate 
systems requires a standard ap-
proach to building and deploying in-
dividual components of functionality. 
Researchers have recognized interop-
erability as a key facet of smart grid 
functionality, and within the industry, 
there is much activity on standardizing 
data formats, such as from the US Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology8 and the IEEE P2030 Work-
ing Group.9 However, data formatting 
is only one component of lexible, 
open systems that must also adhere to 
expected levels of robustness, extensi-
bility, and graceful degradation.
Multiagent systems technology is 
a way of developing loosely coupled 
autonomous systems, where each 
segment of the system can indepen-
dently pursue its goals while using 
standards-conforming messaging to 
interact with others.10 This has sev-
eral advantages. If one agent fails in 
its task, it does not necessarily af-
fect or degrade the others in the 
system. Considering the integra-
tion of smart grid capabilities, if a 
condition-monitoring agent were to 
stop responding, it need not adversely 
affect agents performing control 
roles. The loss of some functionality 
might lead to less optimal network 
management, but it will not prevent 
other agents from taking reasonable 
decisions based on less complete in-
formation. Particular agent platform 
deployments can produce a more or 
less robust system,2 but in general an 
agent approach allows for graceful 
degradation.
A multiagent architecture for the 
smart grid can build on the standards 
already developed for interoperability 
within the power industry. For exam-
ple, data exchange between utilities 
is facilitated by the Common Infor-
mation Model (CIM), and there is a 
growing use of the IEC 61850 stan-
dard for intrasubstation messaging. 
These standards cover the main do-
mains of communication required by 
agents performing smart grid roles 
and hence can form the basis of a 
smart-grid agent ontology. The IEEE 
Power and Energy Society Multiagent 
Systems Working Group aims to pro-
mote the openness of agent architec-
tures within the power domain and 
provide an upper ontology based on 
CIM on their website (http://ewh.
ieee.org/mu/pes-mas).
In addition, we have identiied ive 
key agent roles within a smart-grid 
monitoring system, which offer tem-
plates for agent behavior and interac-
tions.2 By loosely standardizing the 
roles and interactions, agents can be 
designed such that behaviors provid-
ing social ability for each role can be 
reused with some parameterization. 
These roles are not exclusive, with 
speciic provisions for interfacing to 
clusters of agents (such as PEDA) that 
do not implement the roles. For those 
that do, the reuse of social behavior 
code saves on development time and 
allows new data sources and services 
to be automatically locatable by ex-
isting system agents. 
The changing nature of the elec-tricity network makes it a more 
complex, dynamic system to manage. 
Intelligent systems can provide au-
tomation of many of the tasks cur-
rently performed by engineers, but in 
ways that are generically applicable, 
extensible to changing regimes, and 
explainable.
The deployment of automated in-
telligence allows for information ex-
change across the traditional bound-
aries of engineering roles, improving 
decision-making. Realizing this de-
pends on communication between 
each area of analysis, while robust-
ness relies on the autonomy of each 
role. We believe the intelligent systems 
techniques and applications we discuss 
represent the building blocks of smart-
grid architectures, while multiagent 
systems offer a platform technology 
for deployment of this functionality. 
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